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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLITICS 
AND THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
 LAW OF COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 
Graeme W. Austin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n 1992, a leading British commentator called for the devel-
opment of a “much needed private international law of in-
tellectual property.”1  Within the common law tradition, rela-
tively little work had been done on the topic, but a few impor-
tant contributions to the academic literature existed in Europe.2  
Path-breaking work by many distinguished scholars3 has since 
occurred, and there is now a growing body of case law on cross-
border intellectual property issues.  The current American Law 
Institute project, Intellectual Property: Principles Governing 
  
 * J. Byron McCormick Professor of Law, Rogers College of Law, Univer-
sity of Arizona.  This article began as a speech delivered at the Brooklyn Law 
School Symposium: Intellectual Property Online: The Challenge of Multi-
Territorial Disputes.  While this article cites other Preliminary Drafts of the 
ALI Principles, the Symposium discussion focused on Preliminary Draft No. 3.   
Thanks to Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss for her insightful comments on an 
earlier draft and to Professor Richard Garnett for his advice on Australian 
copyright law. Thanks also to Cinead Kubiak for her careful and insightful 
editing.  Responsibility for errors remains my own. 
 1. P. B. Carter, Decisions of the British Courts During 1990, 61 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 386, 402 (1991). 
 2. See, e.g., EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1978). 
 3. For a sample of these contributions, see Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private 
International Law of Copyright, 273 RECEUIL DES COURS 253 (1998); Graeme 
B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create 
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An 
Alert to the Intellectual Property Bar: The Hague Judgments Convention, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 421 (2001); Timothy R. Hollbrook, Territoriality Waning? Pat-
ent Infringement for Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2004); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual 
Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997); Paul 
Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network: Strategies for International Intel-
lectual Property in Flux, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 69 (1998).   On the specific 
issue of copyright ownership, the topic of the present article, see Paul Edward 
Geller, Conflict of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership 
Issues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 351 (2004). 
I 
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Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational 
Disputes Law (ALI Project),4 is another important stage in the 
development of this body of doctrine and commentary. 
In the last decade, we have seen the continued rise of an “in-
tellectual property politics.”5  The politics of intellectual prop-
erty has many facets.  Some have described aspects of the do-
mestic politics of intellectual property as a “war”6 characterized 
by bitter disputes over the boundary between private rights and 
the public interest.  In the international context, we are also 
witnessing fierce debates over the consequences of “imposing” 
western intellectual property norms on developing countries.7  
This debate is playing out in some developed nations as well, 
where there is an energized concern whether national interests 
are well served by a “one-size-fits-all” approach to international 
intellectual property.8  In addition, set against dominant inter-
  
 4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL 
DISPUTES (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]; The Role of Equivalents and 
Prosecution History in Defining the Scope of Patent Protection, International 
Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (IAPIP) Resolution 
Q175 (Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/resolutions/ 
Q175_E.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., Deborah Halbert, Globalized Resistance to Intellectual Prop-
erty (Feb. 3, 2005) (paper presented at New York University’s Engelberg Cen-
ter Colloquium on Innovation Policy, on file with author); James Boyle, A 
Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 
87 (1997). 
 6. Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 337 
(2002); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 
908 (2004). 
 7. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 5; PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002); Ruth 
G. Okediji, Perspectives on Globalization from Developing States: Copyright 
and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 
155–56 (1999); Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of 
Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property Development, 18 L. & POL’Y 315 
(1996). 
 8. See e.g., Michael Geist, Copyright Reform is Not a Spectator Sport 
(Nov. 2004) (discussing Canadian copyright law reforms), at http://www. 
caut.ca/en/bulletin/issues/2004_nov/comm_copyrightreform.asp.  The ground-
breaking work currently underway by two New Zealand law professors, Geoff 
McLay and Susy Frankel, both of Victoria University of Wellington School of 
Law, provides another example.  Professors McLay and Frankel are currently 
engaged in an exhaustive empirical analysis of the domestic impact of New 
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national trends is an emerging counter-discourse focused on the 
checks that international human rights law might impose on 
the seemingly inexorable rise of public international law obliga-
tions in the intellectual property context.9 
This intellectual property politics forms part of the back-
ground context for initiatives such as the ALI Project.  Interna-
tional conflict of laws might be viewed (unjustifiably) as a 
somewhat arcane and abstract branch of the common law, aloof 
from most political frays.  However, in the present context, the 
typical traditions of conflict of laws, theorizing and cool-headed 
analysis, must now engage the highly politicized concerns of 
contemporary intellectual property law and policy.  Accordingly, 
whatever the theoretical or logical unassailability of conflict of 
laws principles distilled by the ALI Project, it might be helpful 
if they were justifiable in ways that respond to relevant issues 
arising in current debates about the future shape of intellectual 
property law in domestic and international contexts. 
In my remarks, I shall explore this point in the context of 
rules for copyright ownership.  This is only one part of the large 
collection of issues addressed in the ALI Report10 and in other 
commentary and doctrine on the interrelationship between in-
tellectual property and private international law.  It is also a 
tiny part of intellectual property doctrine.  Nevertheless, even 
this narrow focus hints at some of the broader advantages of 
engaging conflict of laws issues in ways that are informed by 
intellectual property politics.  Solutions to conflict of laws prob-
  
Zealand’s intellectual property law, focusing in particular on how well New 
Zealand laws actually serve the needs of industry and the commercial sector. 
See Geoff McLay & Susy Frankel, Survey of Intellectual Property Use in New 
Zealand, at http://www.vuw.ac.nz/home/surveys/ip_survey.html (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2005). 
 9. See generally Lawrence Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement 
and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (discussing ways that international human rights law 
might provide checks on the public international law of intellectual property); 
Audrey R. Chapman, Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: 
Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c), U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Agenda Item 
3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/12 (2000), available at http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/447/83/pdf/G0044783.pdf?OpenElement (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2005). 
 10. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4.  
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lems may be more likely to endure if they address the broad 
concerns voiced in this body of scholarship and commentary.  
Not all aspects of intellectual property politics will be rele-
vant to rules about ownership in cross-border contexts.  Yet, the 
tension between efficient international protection of copyright 
on the one hand, and respect for territorial sovereignty, or com-
ity, on the other, is likely to be particularly important to current 
and future debates.  Efficiency-promoting ideas, which are often 
distilled as transnational norms,11 are sometimes animated by a 
concern that insistence on strict territoriality can thwart robust 
enforcement and/or economic exploitation of intellectual prop-
erty rights in cross-border contexts.12  Set against efficiency 
claims are the principles of territoriality and comity.  Territori-
ality and comity are common legal vehicles for expressing the 
political concerns embedded in the notion of sovereignty.13  Ter-
ritoriality taps into deep concerns about “what’s ours to regu-
late.”  Transnational or private international rules are often 
meant to override domestic policy choices and remove at least 
some14 of the scope that territoriality allows for expression of 
regulatory choices, but that does not stop people feeling resent-
ful or angry about them.  In a less emotionally freighted way, 
these concerns emphasize the normative connection between 
  
 11. Transnational norms are not the only candidates for more efficient 
management of intellectual property issues across international borders.  See 
generally Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943 (1998) (exploring methods for “privatizing” intellectual 
property, including technological self-help and contract).  
 12. See, e.g., Adreas P. Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright 
Conflicts on Global Networks, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 799 (1998); Jane C. Gins-
burg, The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territoriality and Authors’ Rights 
in a Networked World, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347 
(1999). 
 13. See generally David J. Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets 
as a Challenge to National Regulatory Systems, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 287 (2004) 
(discussing how the modern global marketplace challenges the effectiveness of 
jurisdictional law). 
 14. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Dreyfuss, International Intellec-
tual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431 
(2004) (exploring the scope provided by the TRIPS Agreement for domestic 
self-determination in the development of research policies). 
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domestic intellectual property laws and political accountabil-
ity.15   
Part II of my remarks discusses the tension and interrela-
tionship between sovereignty and efficiency concerns in private 
international law doctrine in light of two recent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Can-
ada: F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran16 and SOCAN v. 
Canadian Association of Internet Providers.17  Part III turns to 
the specific issue of choice of law for copyright ownership, and 
examines contrasting approaches to this issue within the Anglo-
American tradition.  The approach adopted by U.S. courts is 
that the law with the closest relationship to the property and 
the parties determines copyright ownership.18  This “single gov-
erning law” approach contrasts with that adopted by an Austra-
lian federal court, which held that questions of ownership run 
with the law governing infringement.19  The latter approach has 
the potential for multiple laws to govern ownership when a 
copyright infringement action involves allegations of copyright 
infringement in multiple jurisdictions.  I suggest that a single 
governing law approach to copyright ownership better accom-
modates both efficiency and sovereignty concerns than choice of 
law approaches that seek to apply all the various laws of the 
different nations in which a copyright work might be exploited 
without authorization.  Most importantly, a single governing 
law approach can be justified as consistent with the concept of 
retaining a strong connection between the intellectual property 
laws that govern copyright ownership and the domestic policies 
of the nations for which these laws have greatest relevance.  
Part IV briefly concludes. 
  
 15. See generally Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritori-
ality and the Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992) 
(noting the possibilities for resentment following the exportation of American 
legal norms).  
 16. 542 U.S. 155, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004).  
 17. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can. v. Cana-
dian Ass’n of Internet Providers [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427. 
 18. See infra Part III for further discussion of U.S. judicial approaches to 
choice of law. 
 19. This case is discussed further infra Part III.  
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II. SOVEREIGNTY AND EFFICIENCY  
Two decisions last June from the highest courts of the United 
States and Canada illustrate some of the distinctions between 
“sovereignty-based” and “efficiency-promoting” approaches to 
international conflict of laws issues.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
decision, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, was a deci-
sion about the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws 
rather than intellectual property laws.20  However, the ringing 
endorsement that the Court gave to “prescriptive comity” may 
resonate in other contexts, including intellectual property.  The 
Supreme Court held that U.S. antitrust law could not be ap-
plied when the adverse effects of alleged anticompetitive behav-
ior in foreign territories was distinct and separate from adverse 
domestic effects.21  The Court reasoned that extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. law would impede different nations’ laws 
“work[ing] together in harmony—a harmony particularly 
needed in today’s highly interdependent commercial world.”22   
Given the rarity of antitrust cases in which domestic and for-
eign harms can be easily segregated, it is curious that the Em-
pagran Court bothered to trumpet the territoriality of different 
nations’ commercial laws.  The Empagran decision might be 
dismissed as merely an academic exercise with little practical 
application.  The Court’s vehement championing of sovereignty 
interests may, however, hint at an emerging concern to confine 
U.S. laws within their proper territorial scope.  Consider the 
following passage from Justice Breyer’s opinion:   
Where foreign anticompetitive conduct plays a significant role 
and where foreign injury is independent of domestic effects, 
Congress might have hoped that America’s antitrust laws, so 
fundamental a component of our own economic system, would 
  
 20. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2366.  Empagran involved allegations of a 
price-fixing conspiracy by vitamin sellers around the world, leading to higher 
prices for purchasers of vitamins in the United States and in a number of 
foreign territories.  After the domestic purchasers settled, five foreign pur-
chasers from the Ukraine, Australia, Ecuador and Panama continued their 
antitrust claims.  The Supreme Court held that while a purchaser in the 
United States could bring a Sherman Act claim, the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) barred the respondents’ claims with re-
spect to the higher prices paid for vitamins in the foreign markets. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
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commend themselves to other nations as well.  But, if Amer-
ica’s antitrust policies could not win their own way in the in-
ternational marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must as-
sume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal 
imperialism, through legislative fiat.23  
In line with these ideas, Justice Breyer distinguished earlier 
Supreme Court decisions24 on the basis that they did not focus 
explicitly on whether the claim sought to cure “only independ-
ently caused foreign harm.”25   The Empagran opinion suggests 
that earlier cases did not clearly perceive important territorial 
distinctions.  The Court’s decision implies that we need to look 
at modern cross-border commercial cases differently than in the 
past.  Concepts such as “global harm,” however resonant or 
supportive of efficiency-promoting solutions to transnational 
problems, may need to give way to analysis that focuses instead 
on distinct, territorially-based injuries.   
The Empagran Court’s deference to the legitimate interests of 
foreign nations, and its determination to hold Congress to this 
standard, contrasts markedly with the Court’s 1952 decision in 
Steele v. Bulova Watch.26  In Bulova, the only modern Supreme 
Court opinion on the territorial reach of U.S. intellectual prop-
erty laws, the Court adopted an expansive approach to the leg-
islative jurisdiction provided by the Lanham Act27 and held that 
a district court was entitled to apply the Act to the defendant’s 
conduct in Mexico.28  Congress has not, of course, entirely won 
  
 23. Id. at 2369. 
 24. Id.  Justice Breyer distinguished Empagran from Timken Roller Bear-
ing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 595 (1951), United States v. National 
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 325–28 (1947), and United States v. American Tobacco 
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 171–72 (1911).  
 25. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. at 2370. 
 26. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).  The Supreme 
Court did not mention Bulova in Empagran. 
 27. Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1122 (2002). 
 28. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
decided the mirror image of Bulova.  In Group Gigante Sa De CV v. Dallo & 
Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004), which involved a claim of trademark 
infringement by an established Mexican supermarket chain against a Califor-
nia-based chain that had adopted the same name, the Ninth Circuit estab-
lished a “famous marks” exception to the territoriality principle, holding that 
a foreign trademark owner may have superior rights in the United States, 
where a substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American mar-
ket is familiar with the foreign mark.  Id. at 1098. 
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over the world in the marketplace of ideas about intellectual 
property law; full substantive harmonization of intellectual 
property laws has not occurred, notwithstanding concerted ef-
forts toward that end.29  Empagran appears to counsel reticence 
when considering choice of law approaches involving application 
of U.S. intellectual property laws in ways that would override 
foreign laws, lest those approaches also be characterized as leg-
islative or judicial fiat.  Unlike Empagran, findings of fact in 
Bulova supported the conclusion that the defendants’ actions 
adversely affected U.S. commerce.30  For present purposes, how-
ever, the interest in the case lies in the central issue in Bulova: 
interpretation of an important commercial law statute that is 
silent on its territorial reach31 to determine whether Congress 
intended it to apply to conduct in a foreign nation.   The Bulova 
Court acknowledged that “the legislation of Congress will not 
extend beyond the boundaries of the United States unless a 
contrary legislative intent appears.”32  However, this came quite 
late in the opinion, after the Court emphasized that Congress, 
in prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens, “may 
project the impact of its laws beyond the territorial boundaries 
of the United States.”33   
Particularly telling are the differences between the two 
Courts’ approaches to sovereignty interests of foreign nations.  
One of the key defenses mounted by Steele, the principal Bu-
lova defendant, was that he had been first to secure registration 
of the “Bulova” trademark in Mexico.  However, by the date of 
  
 29. In this context, of course, “harmonization” is not necessarily a neutral 
term.  Depending on the context, “harmonization” may be a proxy for the 
ratcheting up of intellectual property protections.  Hence, some scholars refer 
instead to “upward harmonization.”  See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Considering Multi-
ple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, National Sov-
ereignty, ‘Global’ Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 443, 461 (1998).  
 30. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 284–86 (finding inter alia that “as result of the 
distribution of spurious ‘Bulovas,’ Bulova Watch Company’s Texas sales rep-
resentative received numerous complaints from retail jewelers in the Mexican 
border area whose customers brought in for repair defective ‘Bulovas’ which 
upon inspection often turned out not to be products of that company.”).   
 31. See, e.g., Anna R. Popov, Watering Down Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. to 
Reach Commerce Overseas:  Analyzing the Lanham Act’s Extraterritorial 
Reach Under International Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 705, 708 (2004). 
 32. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added).   
 33. Id. at 282.   
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the Supreme Court’s decision, Mexico’s highest court had up-
held an administrative proceeding canceling the Mexican regis-
tration.34  According to the Supreme Court, this meant that 
there was no conflict between Mexican and U.S. laws,  and it 
removed the basis for arguing that application of the Lanham 
Act to conduct in Mexico would interfere with property rights 
granted by a foreign sovereign:  “Where, as here, there can be 
no interference with the sovereignty of another nation, the Dis-
trict Court in exercising its equity powers may command per-
sons properly before it to cease or perform acts outside its terri-
torial jurisdiction.”35  Rhetorically, and perhaps analytically as 
well, the Court conflated the absence of defendant’s private 
rights in the mark with the absence of any overarching concern 
of the foreign sovereign with its ability to administer its own 
trademark system.   
Justice Breyer’s Empagran opinion seems to have more in 
common with the dissenting Justices in Bulova than with the 
Bulova majority.36  In his dissent, which Justice Douglas joined, 
Justice Reed objected that the application of the Lanham Act to 
acts done in Mexico “bring our legislation into conflict with the 
laws and practices of other nations, fully capable of punishing 
infractions of their own laws.”37  Absent “specific words,” the 
dissenting opinion reasoned, federal legislation should not be 
interpreted to “reach Acts done within the territorial limits of 
other sovereignties.”38 Similar sentiments are echoed in Empa-
gran’s insistence that statutes be construed in ways that allow 
different nations’ commercial laws to work harmoniously to-
gether.39 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in SOCAN v. Cana-
dian Association of Internet Providers,40 an important recent 
copyright case, offers a further doctrinal contrast to Empagran’s 
  
 34. See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks on the Line:  The Story of Steele v. 
Bulova, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW STORIES (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Jane 
Ginsburg eds., forthcoming 2005).  
 35. 344 U.S. at 289. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 292. 
 38. Id.  
 39. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 
(2004). 
 40. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427. 
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insistence on constraining the extraterritorial reach of domestic 
commercial laws.  A key issue in this long-running Canadian 
saga over who should be levied for music communicated via the 
Internet was how to determine when a communication occurs 
“in Canada.”  The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the Cana-
dian Copyright Board’s conclusion41 that a communication oc-
curs in Canada only if it originates from a server located within 
Canada.42  The Court declined to hold that a communication to 
the public occurs in Canada only if its recipient public is also 
located in Canada.  Instead, in line with international prece-
dents,43 it held that Canadian courts could exercise jurisdiction 
over communications to the public where there is a “real and 
substantial connection” between the communication and Can-
ada.44  Communication of copyright material could be, in the 
words of the Court, “both here and there.”   
  
 41. SOCAN Statement of Royalties [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417. 
 42. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R.  at 451.  
 43. See, e.g., National Football League v. Prime Time 24 Joint Venture, 
211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000) (U.S. federal court has jurisdiction over transmis-
sions of copyright material to Canada); Los Angeles News Service v. Conus 
Communications Co., 969 F. Supp. 579 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (U.S. copyright 
breached when transmissions originating abroad are received in the United 
States).  The Supreme Court of Canada also cited recent changes to Austra-
lian copyright law, which provide that “to communicate” means “make avail-
able online or electronically transmit (whether over a path, or a combination 
of paths, provided by a material substance or otherwise) a work or other sub-
ject matter” and that “to the public” means “to the public within or outside 
Australia.”  Copyright Act 1968 (Austl.) No. 63 of 1968, § 10(1), as amended by 
the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, Sch. 1, §§ 6, 16.  The 
Court also cited Daniel J. Gervais, Transmissions of Music on the Internet: An 
Analysis of the Copyright Laws of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, 34 VAND J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1363, 1376 
(2001) (concluding that “[c]ourts will likely assert jurisdiction not only over 
transmissions from France, but also transmissions into France that are al-
leged to cause damage.”). 
 44. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R. at 455 (citing Libman v. The Queen [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 178, 212–13 (per La Forest J)):  
As I see it, all that is necessary to make an offence subject to the ju-
risdiction of our courts is that a significant proportion of the activities 
constituting that offence took place in Canada.  As it is put by mod-
ern academics, it is sufficient that there be a ‘real and substantial 
link’ between an offence and this country …. 
Id. 
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Accordingly, jurisdiction under Canadian copyright laws 
might extend to both communications received in and transmit-
ted from Canada.  The scope of jurisdiction, and potential liabil-
ity, will depend on analysis of the facts of the individual case.  
According to the Court, the connecting factors that may be rele-
vant for determining whether the connection to Canada is le-
gally sufficient may include:  the situs of the content provider, 
the host server, the intermediaries, and the end user.45 Localiz-
ing the communication tort at home, so that cross-border com-
munications to the public that implicate domestic copyright 
laws can occur both “here and there,” avoids—at least formalis-
tically—the extraterritoriality problem.  If, under domestic law, 
communication to the public can include every step on the way 
to transmitting the information to the public, the lex fori46 can 
easily reach communications destined for a public population 
located within a foreign jurisdiction as well as—or, indeed, in-
stead of—a public located in the jurisdiction of the forum court.  
In its analysis of this point, the Canadian Court acknowledged 
the possibility of duplicative liability—liability imposed by both 
the recipient and the transmitting state.47  Recall that in Empa-
gran this was exactly the kind of problem that Justice Breyer 
recognized, and sought to avoid, in the antitrust context.  
Rather than engaging with this issue directly, however, Can-
ada’s Court instead stated that the responsibility for solving 
this problem lay with international lawmakers:  “the answer 
lies in the making of international or bilateral agreements, not 
in national courts straining to find some jurisdictional infirmity 
in either State.”48 
An important doctrinal distinction between the two cases is 
that the Canadian Court’s concern was with localizing transna-
tional communications, whereas the U.S. Court was dealing 
with choice of law issues once the legal wrong had been local-
ized.  As Professor Dinwoodie correctly points out in his contri-
bution to this Symposium,49 however, localization of harms as 
  
 45. Id. at 430.  
 46. Lex fori is the law of the forum; the law of the jurisdiction where the 
case is pending.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 47. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R. at 462. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 885 (2005) (transcript of 
symposium presentation). 
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domestic and adoption of the lex fori using choice of law tech-
niques can have similar judicial results.50  At a general level, 
determining whether foreign communications are “sufficiently 
connected” to the forum may share significant commonalities 
with an inquiry into whether foreign harms are “independent” 
from domestic harms.  According to Empagran, foreign laws 
should be overridden only infrequently.  In contrast, the Cana-
dian Court seems to suggest that the risk of duplicative liability 
is something we must live with, at least until a public interna-
tional law solution is developed. 
III. CHOICE OF LAW FOR COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 
How might the tension between sovereignty and efficiency be 
played out when developing choice of law rules for copyright 
ownership?  At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the 
complexities in the notion of territoriality itself.  The cases dis-
cussed in Part II hint at some of this complexity.  Empagran 
seems to trumpet sovereignty values through its insistence on 
constraining the extraterritorial reach of United States anti-
trust law.51  Yet, if we view the case in the wider context of intel-
lectual property rights, the holding might have some important 
extraterritorial effects.  Viewed in light of the real politiks of 
international intellectual property laws, the holding in Empa-
gran may be tantamount to announcing: “you’ve got a lot of 
American-styled intellectual property law, but we won’t use our 
antitrust laws to rein it in.”  Thus, the jurisdictional reticence of 
the Empagran Court may affect (extraterritorially) the scope 
and character of intellectual property rights in other jurisdic-
tions. In contrast, the approach to localization of copyright in-
fringement in SOCAN52—the Court’s apparent willingness to 
apply domestic law to the transmission of musical works to for-
eign publics—seems quite “extraterritorial.”  Equally, however, 
jurisdictions whose substantive laws or approaches to enforce-
ment allow for ready transmission of copyright works using 
  
 50. See Graeme W. Austin, Copyright Across (and Within) Domestic Bor-
ders, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 
WORLD 105, 121–22 (Charles E. F. Rickett & Graeme W. Austin eds., 2000). 
 51. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2363 
(2004). 
 52. SOCAN [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427.  
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digital networks themselves create extraterritorial effects.  
Since transmission of copyright works cannot yet be efficiently 
constrained at international borders, a nation’s laws may have 
an extraterritorial effect if they result in transmission of works 
to other nations where their receipt constitutes unlawful act(s).  
De facto availability, even from foreign sources, has the poten-
tial to override domestic de jure prohibitions.  Viewed in this 
broader context, the approach in SOCAN can be seen, perhaps 
more benignly, as facilitating the development of doctrinal re-
sponses to the extraterritorial effects of other nations’ laws. 
Later in my remarks, I shall briefly explore ways of approach-
ing the notion of territoriality in the context of copyright owner-
ship issues.  First, however, it may be helpful to briefly describe 
the Anglo-American doctrine.  Anglo-American cases have ap-
proached choice of law issues for copyright ownership in con-
trasting ways.  The Second Circuit has held, in Itar-Tass Rus-
sian News Agency v. Russian Kurier,53 that the law governing 
ownership of copyright is the law of the state with the most sig-
nificant relationship with the property and the parties.54  As the 
Copyright Act55 does not contain a controlling provision,56 the 
Second Circuit was self-consciously developing federal common 
law to deal with this cross-border issue.57  The court also recog-
nized that the law determining ownership could be different 
from that governing infringement.58  The trend in U.S. in-
  
 53. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 54. Id. at 90.  The Second Circuit derived this principle from the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222 (1971).   
 55. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–803 (2000)). 
 56. Nor does the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris revision, July 24, 1971) 
[hereinafter Berne Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ 
ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).  See Jane C. Gins-
burg, Ownership of Electronic Rights and the Private International Law of 
Copyright, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 165, 167–68 (1998) (“The [Berne Con-
vention] does not supply a choice of law rule for determining copyright owner-
ship,” but noting that there is an exception in the Berne Convention, Art. 
14bis(2)(a): “Ownership of copyright in a cinematographic work shall be a 
matter for legislation in the country where protection is claimed.”). 
 57. See also Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 270 
F.3d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 58. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 89. 
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fringement cases, aside from the “predicate act” theory dis-
cussed below, is to apply the law of the place in which the acts 
constituting infringement occurred.59  This is a familiar choice of 
law technique:  different laws can apply to different issues in 
the litigation.60  On the facts of the case, the law governing copy-
right ownership was Russian:  “the works at issue were created 
by Russian nationals and first published in Russia.”61  However, 
because the unauthorized reproduction occurred in New York, 
the law governing the infringements was U.S. copyright law.62  
Some fourteen years before the Itar-Tass decision, the Full 
Federal Court of Australia, a court of broadly equivalent stand-
ing to a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, was seized of the same 
issue.  Rejecting the analysis of the trial judge,63 the Australian 
Federal Court in Enzed Holdings Ltd. v. Wynthea Pty. Ltd.64 
held that Australian law governed all issues in a case involving 
infringement in Australia of logos created in New Zealand, for 
New Zealand clients, by a New Zealand graphic designer.65  
Whereas New Zealand law would have vested copyright in the 
plaintiffs, as commissioners of the design,66 Australian law con-
tains no equivalent provision, leaving the plaintiffs without title 
to the copyright upon which to base the infringement action.  
The Australian Court’s analysis was fully reasoned on the own-
  
 59. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 
145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998); Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, No. 01 Civ. 
7109(GEL), 2003 WL 1787123 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2003).  
 60. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222 cmt. d 
(1969) (“The courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all 
the issues under the local law of a single state.”). 
 61. Itar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 90. 
 62. See also Silberman, 2003 WL 1787123, at *35. 
 63. Enzed Holdings Ltd. v. Wynthea Pty. Ltd. (1984) ATPR 40-447. 
 64. Enzed Holdings Ltd. v. Wynthea Pty. Ltd. (1984) 4 F.C.R. 450. 
 65. Id. at 458.  See also SUSY FRANKEL & GEOFF MCLAY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN NEW ZEALAND 64–65 (2002).  
 66. The Copyright Act, 1994 (N.Z.).  Section 21(3) provides as follows:  
Where – (a) A person commissions, and pays or agrees to pay for, the 
taking of a photograph or the making of a computer program, paint-
ing, drawing, diagram, map, chart, plan, engraving, model, sculpture, 
film, or sound recording; and (b) The work is made in pursuance of 
that commission, – that person is the first owner of any copyright in 
the work.   
Id. 
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ership point.  Indeed, unlike the Second Circuit’s Itar-Tass rule, 
which is grounded in general conflict of laws principles relating 
to property, the Australian Court grounded its analysis in the 
Australian Copyright Act and accompanying regulations.67  In 
particular, the Australian Court looked to those provisions that, 
consistent with the Berne Convention,68 extend protection under 
Australian law to foreign authors.  The Court found the Austra-
lian Copyright Act’s extension of Australian copyright law to 
protect foreign authors was of plenary application.69  Accord-
ingly, it saw “no reason to exclude the Australian provisions 
relating to ownership of copyright.”70 
As the contributions by Professors Richard Garnett71 and 
Graeme Dinwoodie72 to this Symposium explain, in a growing 
number of contexts, statutory directives already localize intel-
lectual property questions.  The U.S. Copyright Act’s choice of 
law rule governing copyright in restored works provides an ex-
ample:  ownership is determined by “the author or initial right 
holder of the work as determined by the law of the source coun-
try of the work.”73  For the most part, however, courts are pro-
vided little direction on choice of law for copyright ownership.  
In the context of registered rights, resolution of ownership is-
sues is likely to involve at least some action by local registers.  
The ALI Project proposes that the law to determine the initial 
title of registered rights be the law of “each country of registra-
tion.”74  This approach means that sovereignty and efficiency 
concerns coincide.  Yet, a copyright’s existence does not depend 
on the intervention of national or regional registers, but comes 
into being with an author’s creative act.  As a result, sover-
eignty and efficiency concerns are not so readily reconciled.  
  
 67. Enzed, 4 F.C.R. at 456–59. 
 68. Berne Convention, supra note 56. 
 69. Enzed, 4 F.C.R. at 458. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Richard L. Garnett, Trademarks and the Internet: Resolution of Inter-
national IP Disputes by Unilateral Application of U.S. Laws, 30 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 925 (2005). 
 72. Dinwoodie, supra note 49. 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b) (2005). 
 74. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 311(1). 
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A. Efficiency and Sovereignty Concerns 
Supporting Itar-Tass are some obvious appeals to efficiency.  
Under Itar-Tass, only one law for copyright ownership need be 
ascertained.  That said, as international collaborations increase, 
along with author mobility, it may become more difficult to ap-
ply the “closest relationship with the property and the parties” 
test with predictive certainty.  Unlike the Enzed Holdings ap-
proach, under which rules on ownership run with the lex protec-
tionis (i.e., the law of the country for which protection is 
claimed), it will not necessarily be possible to identify the appli-
cable law with absolute certainty in advance.  Itar-Tass makes 
choice of law for ownership issues much more of a judicial, fact-
based inquiry.    
This does not necessarily pose an insurmountable problem.  
The current draft of the ALI Project puts forward an elaborate 
list of principles to determine ownership in more complex 
cases.75  These principles will assist decision-makers by covering 
a greater range of factual scenarios where determining the law 
with the closest connection with the property and the parties 
might be difficult.  We should also not think that a territorialist 
approach, which creates the potential for different owners ac-
cording to different laws, will always be simple to apply in prac-
tice.  As Mireille van Eechoud points out, if a territorialist ap-
proach were multiplied across different jurisdictions, there 
would be no single law to which chain of title could be traced.76  
On the other hand, a single governing law approach may be 
inconsistent with broader sovereignty concerns.  Since intellec-
tual property rights have been traditionally conceptualized as 
territorial, identifying the law with the closest relationship to 
the parties and the property seems to beg the question of what 
“property” really means.  By applying one law to the ownership 
issue, the Itar-Tass choice of law rule renders inoperative do-
mestic copyright ownership laws of the places where the work is 
exploited.77  Moreover, even though foreign law applied to the 
  
 75. Id. § 313. 
 76. MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD, CHOICE OF LAW IN COPYRIGHT AND RELATED 
RIGHTS:  ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEX PROTECTIONIS 178 (2004).   
 77. For tangible property, the law distinguishes physical items and the 
legal rights, but there is usually only one “thing” whose ownership need be 
determined.  Even with other forms of intangible property, no national treat-
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issue of initial title in Itar-Tass, in many other cases it seems 
quite likely, given global patterns of copyright consumption and 
production, that U.S. law will apply.  Add to this the fact that 
U.S. courts have developed a choice of law theory for copyright 
infringement—the so called “predicate act” theory78—that, in 
some contexts, seems to be tantamount to extraterritorial appli-
cation of U.S. copyright principles to infringing conduct occur-
ring in foreign territories.  The result appears quite similar to 
the legal imperialism that the Empagran Court seemed so con-
cerned to avoid.   
Particular sensitivity about the impact of foreign laws on do-
mestic property was recently manifest in an English case, in 
which the trial judge declared: “the concept of a world wide 
copyright is not acceptable as a matter of law.”79  The comment 
was made in the context of a dispute involving different claims 
of ownership to the works of Cuban composers (after their ini-
tial assignment), a dispute that eventually reached the English 
Court of Appeal.80  Peer International Corp. v. Termidor Music 
Publishers Ltd.81 involved competing claims to English copy-
rights in musical works composed by Cuban nationals.  The 
copyrights had been assigned under contracts entered into in 
the 1930s and 1940s.  A post-Revolutionary Cuban law pur-
ported to divest prior assignees of copyrights in Cuban music of 
their rights for all countries for which the copyrights had been 
assigned, unless the transfers had been approved by a Cuban 
government agency.  The English Court of Appeal was required 
to determine whether the post-Revolutionary law or the earlier 
assignments governed ownership of copyright with respect to 
  
ment principle equivalent to that mandated by the Berne Convention for 
copyrights gives rise to hundreds of different legal rights under foreign legal 
systems.  See Berne Convention, supra note 56. 
 78. The “predicate act” theory provides that a U.S. court may apply U.S. 
law to provide monetary relief for copyright infringements that occur abroad, 
where a defendant has, within the United States, made an infringing copy 
that facilitated the foreign infringements.  See, e.g., Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin 
Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988); Los Angeles News Service v. 
Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 340 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 79. Peer Int’l Corp. v. Termidor Music Publishers Ltd. [2002] Ch. 2675, 
[2002] All E.R. (D) 143, at para. 71. 
 80. Peer Int’l Corp. v. Termidor Music Publishers Ltd. [2004] 2 W.L.R. 849.   
 81. Id. 
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the exploitation of the compositions in England.  Predictably, 
the Court held that English law governed. 
Peer International involved foreign expropriation of domestic 
property, for which there are special rules.82  Nevertheless, the 
English judges’ analysis suggests that their concerns over the 
effect of foreign laws on domestic English copyrights went 
deeper.83  The Court was concerned with principles at the heart 
of the English legal system’s domain over property situated in 
the United Kingdom.  In support of the specific rule negativing 
the effect of an attempt by a foreign sovereign to expropriate 
U.K. copyrights, the U.K. Court of Appeal identified a number 
of more general principles that precluded application of the Cu-
ban law in the United Kingdom:84 (1) the prohibition against 
extraterritoriality itself, (2) the “principle which favors the lex 
situs generally,”85 and, most significantly, (3) the problem that 
“if extraterritorial effect is given to foreign property legislation, 
it can only be at the expense of English law affecting the same 
subject matter.”86 
Giving effect to foreign law affecting local property would 
create tension with the principle that domestic statutes are “de-
signed to fit in with each other.”87  The Peer International Court 
  
 82. DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 995 (13th ed. 2000). The 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York recognized this point 
recently in Films by Jove, Inc. v. Beroy, 341 F. Supp. 2d. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), 
where it declined to defer to a ministerial directive of the Russian government 
that purported to change the ownership of a copyright license after judgment 
had been rendered by a U.S. Court.  The earlier opinion is reported at 154 F. 
Supp. 2d. 156, motion for reconsideration denied, 250 F. Supp. 2d. 156 
(E.D.N.Y.).  The ALI Principles also address “Transfers by Operation of Law,” 
and provide that for registered rights, the law of the country of registration 
governs such transfers.  For unregistered rights, the Principles propose that 
such transfers are governed by the law of the country “for which protection is 
claimed.”  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 316. 
 83. Accordingly, the fundamental principles on which the English Court of 
Appeal drew for its analysis in Peer International suggest that the case cannot 
simply be analogized to § 201(e) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which holds most 
involuntary transfers of copyright to be ineffective.  17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2005). 
 84. The English Court relied on an important decision by Lord Devlin in 
Bank Voor Handel En Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q.B. 248, [1952] 2 
All E.R. 956. 
 85. Peer Int’l [2004] 2 W.L.R. 849, at para. 37 (citing Bank Voor Handel En 
Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q.B. 248, 257).   
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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pointed out that “foreign legislation cannot be so designed, and 
it will generally be founded on a basis of property law very dif-
ferent from our own.”88  The Court concluded:  
[A] principle of private international law that allows property 
legislation to operate in the territory of another country, so far 
from being a principle which resolves the conflict of laws, will 
create a conflict which it will require the formulation of a new 
system to settle.  There seems … to be every reason … for giv-
ing effect to the simple rule that generally property in Eng-
land is subject to English law and to no other.89  
Informing the Court’s conclusion that the Cuban law was inef-
fective in the United Kingdom was a general concern that for-
eign law should not affect ownership interests in property situ-
ated within the forum.   
B. Justifying Copyright Ownership Rules 
One might think that copyright ownership issues in the 
transnational context perhaps can be seen to implicate domestic 
sovereignty interests to a lesser extent than substantive rules 
on infringement.  Laws governing ownership do not, for in-
stance, directly determine the availability or price of materials 
of culture in different nations.  Ownership rules are about who 
benefits from the copyright in the work, and have less to do 
with the work’s availability to the public. They might, however, 
implicate incentives to create copyright works.  Nevertheless, as 
Peer International illustrates, the link between copyright own-
ership and domestic sovereignty concerns can tap powerful rhe-
torical resources and ideological and practical concerns that 
may be invoked when foreign legal principles might override 
domestic policy choices.  That is, even if the potential for “con-
flict” is likely to arise in a relatively narrow compass, and is 
likely to be confined to rules on commissioned works and works 
made for hire, it is possible to imagine how the perception of a 
foreign law’s usurpation of domestic policy choices about such 
matters could trigger more heightened rhetoric.  Put another 
way, because “sovereignty-respecting” concerns provide a politi-
cally-resonant way to understand the legal and political issues 
  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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at stake, the perception that legal actors might ride roughshod 
over domestic policy choices will provoke cries of “these are U.K. 
copyrights!” or “these are American copyrights!,” and so on.  
This is the essence of several current political controversies sur-
rounding the globalization of intellectual property.90 
In the Anglo-American tradition, there has perhaps been too 
much solicitude for sovereignty interests, particularly in the 
subject matter or legislative jurisdiction contexts.  For instance, 
prior to the English Court of Appeal’s landmark 1999 decision 
in Pearce v. Ove Arup,91 English courts refused to exercise juris-
diction over cases involving allegations of foreign copyright in-
fringement.92  In a line of twentieth-century Australian cases, 
beginning with an Australian High Court decision from 1903,93 
Commonwealth courts analogized intellectual property rights to 
land—a type of property that has long been viewed as inti-
mately connected with the sovereign powers of the nation 
state.94  Also, in many Commonwealth jurisdictions, infringe-
ment of foreign intellectual property rights foundered on the so-
called “double actionability” or “lex fori” rule, which, broadly 
summarized, required the defendant’s tort to be actionable ac-
cording to both the lex fori and the law of the place of commis-
sion of a tort.95  Due to the territorial confines of intellectual 
property rights, foreign infringement could never be actionable 
  
 90. See generally Halbert, supra note 5. 
 91. Pearce v. Ove Arup P’ship Ltd. [1999] 1 All E.R. 769 (Eng. C.A.).  The 
Ove Arup decision was recently applied in the cross-border context in R Griggs 
Group Ltd. v. Evans [2004] All E.R. (D) 155 (Eng.), aff’d on other grounds, 
[2005] E.W.C.A. 11 (Eng. C.A.).  Sitting as Deputy Judge of the High Court, 
Peter Prescott Q.C. held that where an English Court has in personam juris-
diction over a defendant, the Court may require assignment of a copyright 
arising under a foreign law. 
 92. See Tyburn Productions Ltd. v. Conan Doyle, 1990 R.P.C. 185 (Ch. D.); 
Def Lepp Music v. Stuart-Brown, 1986 R.P.C. 273 (Ch. D.). 
 93. Potter v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co. (1906) 3 C.L.R. 479 (Austl.); Nor-
bert Steinhardt & Son Ltd. v. Meth (1961) 105 C.L.R. 440 (Austl.). 
 94. The traditional common law rule was that a domestic court had no 
jurisdiction over disputes involving foreign land in which rights over the land 
required determination. See British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de 
Moçambique [1893] 1 App. Cas. 602 (Eng. P.C.). 
 95. Compare Boys v. Chaplin [1971] 1 A.C. 356, 379, 389 (U.K.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.), with Red Sea Insurance Co. v. Bouygues S.A. [1995] 1 A.C. 
190 (P.C. 1994) (U.K.) (appeal taken from Hong Kong) (adopting greater flexi-
bility in the common law version of the rule). 
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according to the lex fori.  English copyright law, for instance, 
does not make unauthorized exploitation of a copyright work a 
legal wrong in foreign territory.96   
In the Commonwealth, the requirement that foreign torts be 
actionable according to the lex fori has mostly been jettisoned, 
replaced by the lex loci as the dominant choice of law rule.97  
Dean Anne Marie Slaughter cites this development as indica-
tive of a more sensitive transnationalism that is developing in 
the thinking of national courts.98  The rule analogizing intellec-
tual property rights to land, which itself reflects a hyper-
sensitivity to foreign sovereignty interests, gave rise to ironic 
results:  respect for these “special” property rights created under 
the laws of a foreign sovereign risks rendering them unenforce-
able.  Concern for the interests of foreign sovereigns in crafting 
intellectual property laws may thwart the very policies that 
conflicts rules were meant to respect.  It is impossible to pre-
cisely determine what influenced the English Court of Appeal’s 
departure from the orthodox view in Ove Arup.99  Their Lord-
ships’ analysis of the common law justiciability issue was en-
tirely, and meticulously, doctrinal.  Whatever the motivation, 
the English court’s determination to jettison their earlier ag-
gregation of sovereignty concerns to conflicts rules is a very 
welcome development.  The approach to justiciability adopted 
by the English Court of Appeals better respects sovereignty in-
terests in foreign intellectual property rights.  Additionally, by 
facilitating the consolidation of proceedings, it is more efficient.  
As an attempt to accommodate some of the broader political 
concerns arising in intellectual property law today, I would ad-
vocate localizing copyright ownership issues broadly in line 
with the Second Circuit in Itar-Tass.  I advocate this approach 
not so much because the Itar-Tass approach will facilitate more 
  
 96. See generally Graeme W. Austin, The Infringement of Foreign Intellec-
tual Property Rights, 113 LAW Q. REV. 321 (1997). 
 97. In major Commonwealth jurisdictions, the lex fori rule has largely been 
abandoned.  For example, the United Kingdom has enacted the Private Inter-
national Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, c. 42 (Eng.).  Other juris-
dictions have abandoned this rule through case law.  See, e.g., Tolofson v. Jen-
sen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (Can.); Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. 
Zhang (2002) 210 C.L.R. 491 (Austl.).  
 98. ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 90 (2004).  
 99. [1999] 1 All E.R. 769 (Eng. C.A.). 
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efficient licensing and tracing of title, although this is impor-
tant, or because it is broadly in line with choice of law principles 
for other types of property.  Rather, I think the Itar-Tass ap-
proach can be adapted in a way that is sensitive to the role of 
nation states in determining the real life societal contexts in 
which intellectual property is created.   
Focusing on this kind of concern might enrich our under-
standing of territoriality, and encourage us, at least in the intel-
lectual property context, to view territoriality in less formalistic 
terms.  The approach adopted by the Enzed Holdings court 
might appear to be respectful of domestic sovereignty interests.  
It would allow the law of country X to govern ownership “in” 
country X, country Y’s laws to govern ownership “in” country Y, 
and so on.  On the other hand, it may have the practical effect of 
overriding some of the important social policy choices reflected 
in the law of the place where a work was first created.  Of 
course, intellectual property exploitation is now a global con-
cern.  Nevertheless, choice of law rules for copyright ownership 
should be crafted to take into account the reality that different 
nations’ social policies, such as the education system, employ-
ment laws, subsidies for artistic creativity, development of 
communication networks, and idiosyncratic exceptions and de-
fenses in the copyright system itself, constitute the material 
circumstances in which copyright works are created.100  The ma-
terial circumstances of production fuel authors’ “creative 
sparks.”   
Similar concerns seem to be reflected in U.S. rules in the 
work-for-hire context, which designates as employer (hence 
usually the “owner” of the work) the party who controls the 
manner and means of production.101  Domestic social policies 
are, at least partly, responsible for the material circum-
stances—the “manner and means”102—in which authorial crea-
  
 100. I develop this argument more fully in Graeme W. Austin, Valuing 
“Domestic Self-Determination” in International Intellectual Property Juris-
prudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155 (2002). 
 101. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) 
(invoking common law agency principles to determine when a creator is a 
worker for hire). 
 102. Id. (“In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the 
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party’s right to control 
the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.”). 
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tivity occurs.  Furthermore, because many issues are likely to 
arise in the employment context, we can expect local or regional 
rules to reflect domestic traditions, or hard-won compromises, 
about the appropriate balance of power between employees and 
employers when confronting the issue of ownership of the fruits 
of creativity.  Accordingly, I would advocate adapting the Itar-
Tass rule, while retaining the general premise that a single 
governing law should apply to cross-border ownership issues.  
In many instances, we would likely see no difference in the ap-
plication of the “closest relationship to the property and the 
parties” rule.  Nevertheless, by focusing on the place with the 
closest relationship with the production of the work, we would 
be crafting solutions to international conflict of laws problems 
that evince broad concern for the connection between domestic 
sovereignty and intellectual property regimes. A more nuanced 
approach to territoriality, one that is informed by a robust sense 
of intellectual property politics, might take these kinds of con-
cerns into account when crafting specific rules.103 
In earlier writings, I have argued that application of the lex 
protectionis to infringement questions is justified, in part, be-
cause intellectual property rights bear the lineaments of socie-
tal choices and struggles over access to the materials of cul-
ture.104  I again suggest, therefore, that the incidents of property 
rights should be determined by the law of the nation whose 
members bear the costs of enforcement.105  Yet, place of exploita-
tion does not so obviously have a claim to determine legal issues 
relating to the initial creation of the work.  Conversely, sensitiv-
ity to the material circumstances of production in the crafting of 
  
 103. Where several authors are involved, as may be the case with some 
outsourcing arrangements, and the issue cannot be determined by reference to 
applicable contractual terms, it may be necessary to develop subsidiary rules.  
One possibility would be to focus on the contribution of the “dominant” author.  
This principle is well-known in U.S. joint authorship doctrine.  See, e.g., 
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting the importance of 
the intentions of the “dominant” author when ascertaining whether a work is 
a work of joint authorship).  Perhaps where separately identifiable copyright 
protected contributions to a joint work cannot be identified, and the issue is 
not governed by contract, an appropriate rule might be to adopt the law of the 
place where the dominant author did most of the creative work. 
 104. See, e.g., Graeme W. Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law 
for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 79 OR. L. REV. 575 (2000). 
 105. Id. at 614. 
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conflict of law rules seems to better accommodate the political 
concerns that are grounded in the connection between domestic 
politics and intellectual property. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Academics are of course motivated to find the “right” answer 
to doctrinal controversies.  Yet, academic deliberations are sel-
dom, if ever, dispositive.  Usually, our interventions are more 
modest: we make contributions to ongoing debates.  In some 
respects, the ALI Project is similar.  Because the ALI Project is 
not posing as a “treaty,” and has no pretensions of being “the” 
answer to conflict of laws controversies, or of being imposed on 
the global legal system, the project’s outcomes will more likely 
be a contribution to emerging conversations about how best to 
craft private law principles for transborder disputes involving 
intellectual property rights.  It will be but one (albeit impor-
tant) contribution to the rich dialogue that is occurring among 
jurists in different nations about international law problems.106  
Instead of always attempting to “run to ground” the argu-
ments that can be made in favor of, or against, any particular 
resolution of a private international law controversy, it might 
be productive to consider doctrinal proposals in light of broader 
intellectual property politics.  At least some of the ALI Project’s 
audience, including its most vigorous interlocutors, are likely to 
be deeply involved in the political debates that now inform both 
domestic and international intellectual property lawmaking.  
When we turn our minds to international conflict of laws con-
troversies, it may thus be important to engage with doctrinal 
issues in ways that anticipate and respond to critiques that are 
likely to be informed and shaped by these broader political con-
cerns.  Crafting appropriate choice of law rules for copyright 
ownership forms a small part of the monumental task of devel-
oping much-needed private international law of intellectual 
property.  Even so, attempting to justify a choice of law rule for 
copyright ownership with reference to the material circum-
stances of production of works of authorship might be sugges-
tive of ways of engaging with broader political concerns that 
  
 106. See generally SLAUGHTER, supra note 98. 
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will inevitably arise as other parts of the ALI Project come to be 
scrutinized.  
 
